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Abstract: This article offers an interpretation of British philosopher William Godwin’s
theory of property ownership, as outlined in his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.
Godwin’s work can be read as presenting an incoherent account of property rights,
which, on the one hand, justiﬁes its existence on seemingly utilitarian grounds
while, on the other, impugns its legitimacy on egalitarian grounds. But the
contradiction apparent in Godwin’s position is actually illusory and can in fact be
plausibly interpreted as comprising a coherent two-level understanding of political
morality, wherein the right to own private property is best comprehended as a
“right to do wrong.”
Introduction
The political thought of late eighteenth-century British philosopher William
Godwin has been the subject of frequent labeling in recent years: it has,
among other things, been described as “anarchist,”1 “utilitarian,”2 “perfection-
ist,”3 and “bourgeois radical.”4 Debates over the appropriateness of such rival
labels—though neither unimportant nor uninteresting—have often made
difﬁcult the task of presenting individual aspects of his thought with any
signiﬁcant degree of precision. With this in mind, the aim of this article is to
attempt a more coherent presentation of one of the most important and inﬂu-
ential areas of Godwin’s political philosophy: his account of property owner-
ship. I ﬁrst outline the role of the concept of private property ownership
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within Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political Justice5 and present what he
identiﬁes as three rival justiﬁcations for its existence, only one of which he
regards as acceptable. I then go on to discuss the role of human moral
equality—so important throughout his political theory—within his critique of
property ownership as an institution. My argument is that a two-level inter-
pretation of Godwin’s moral philosophy reveals a coherence that his account
might at ﬁrst seem to lack, which simultaneously allows him to defend
politically and impugn morally the legitimacy of private ownership rights.
The resolution of this issue has obvious resonance for Godwin scholarship,
but it also has wider importance for both the history of political thought
and political theory more generally. The impact of his contribution to late
eighteenth-century political thought was huge, something evinced by his
contemporary William Hazlitt’s oft-quoted remark that
No work in our time gave such a blow to the philosophic mind of the
country as the celebrated Enquiry Concerning Political Justice. Tom Paine
was considered for the time as a Tom Fool to him; Paley an old woman;
Edmund Burke a ﬂashy sophist. Truth, moral truth, it was supposed
had here taken up its abode; and these were the oracles of thought.6
A proper appreciation of Godwin’s writing on property is thus important for
understandings of late eighteenth-century theories of ownership and distri-
butive justice. All of the major British “radical” thinkers of the 1790s—
including Thomas Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft, John Thelwall, and Thomas
Spence7—each inspired to some degree by the French Revolution, discussed
the issue of distributive justice largely through discussions of property rights.
5William Godwin, Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and Its Inﬂuence on Modern
Morals and Happiness, ed. Isaac Kramnick (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976 [1798]),
701. This version of the third edition of the text is currently out of print, but it
remains the most easily accessible.
6William Hazlitt, The Spirit of the Age, ed. E. D. Mackerness (London: Collins, 1969
[1825]), 35–37. As Gregory Claeys notes, although Godwin’s “impact on the plebeian
reform movement was more limited” than on the literate middle classes, it was never-
theless highly inﬂuential on the reformist London Corresponding Society’s charismatic
leading writer, orator, and key theoretician John Thelwall, and partly because of this,
the reach of Godwinian ideas were most deﬁnitely not conﬁned to the formally edu-
cated. Claeys, The French Revolution Debate in Britain: The Origins of Modern Politics
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 135.
7See Paine, “Agrarian Justice,” in The Complete Writings of Thomas Paine, ed. Philip S.
Foner, vol. 1 (New York: Citadel Press, 1969 [1796]); Mary Wollstonecraft,
“A Vindication of the Rights of Men,” in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, ed.
Janet Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 [1790]); Thelwall, “The Rights of
Nature against the Usurpation of Establishments,” in The Political Writings of John
Thelwall, ed. Gregory Claeys (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1995
[1797]); Spence, “The Rights of Infants,” in The Political Writings of Thomas Spence,
ed. H. T. Dickinson (Newcastle: Avero, 1982 [1797]).
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Each of these writers contributed to what historian Gareth Stedman Jones
recently cited as the ﬁrst modern debate about the possibility andmoral right-
ness of the removal of poverty within a commercial economy.8 But Stedman
Jones’s analysis of this debate focuses chieﬂy on the arguments of Paine and
Condorcet, alluding to Godwin’s ideas only in terms of their being the target
of Thomas Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population.9 Such an omission is
also a striking a feature of Thomas Horne’s otherwise comprehensive account
of theories of property in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain.10
Godwin’s account of property rights is also of considerable theoretical inter-
est and perhaps even uniqueness in two senses. First, it departs from an
assumption held—either explicitly or implicitly—by almost all modern the-
ories of ownership. Theories of politics that incorporate robust defenses of
property rights typically place what might be termed a justiﬁcatory burden
on some morally praiseworthy type of individual action. The right of one
agent to exclude another from interference with their justly held resources
is usually explained with reference to a morally signiﬁcant mode of acqui-
sition such as labor in the case of Locke and Nozick, ﬁrst-occupancy in the
case of Grotius, or the extension of an individual’s will into the external
world in the case of Hegel. As will be shown below, Godwin’s defense of
inviolable property rights represents a unique approach to the issue in its
rejection of the relevance of the manner of acquisition when assessing the just-
ness of a holding. How an object is acquired is not the important issue when
gauging its legitimacy but rather the utility its acquisition provides for the
individual holder.
The second unique aspect of Godwin’s theory of property is the way in
which it can be seen ultimately to stem from foundational principles that
would seem antithetical to the existence of such rights: equality and utility.
As will become clear, his theory reveals a commitment to an egalitarian dis-
tribution of ownership, yet in practical terms, his account seems ultimately
to invite and legitimize signiﬁcant inequalities in holdings. Godwin is also
a utilitarian: for him the nature of justice is such that “we have in reality
nothing that is strictly speaking our own.”11 Thus, the idea of a natural
right is “the offspring of ignorance and imbecility.”12 Since “every one of
8Gareth Stedman Jones, An End to Poverty? A Historical Debate (London: Proﬁle,
2004).
9Ibid., 92–96.
10Thomas Horne, Property Rights and Poverty: Political Argument in Britain, 1605–
1834 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990). Like Stedman Jones,
Horne does mention Godwin very brieﬂy but only in relation to a discussion of
Malthus (see 164–65, 167).
11Godwin, Political Justice, 194. “There is no situation in which we can be placed, no
alternative that can be presented to our choice, respecting which duty is silent” (638).
12Ibid., 193–94. In terms of his immediate context, Godwin’s utilitarian rejection of
rights-based theories is singular. For some discussions of the prominence of natural
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our actions fall[s] within the province of morals,” individuals “have no rights
in relation to the selecting of them.”13 However, Godwin’s political theory is
not as hostile to individual rights as such unequivocal declarations suggest.
Indeed, one of my aims in this article is to show that, in fact, the political phil-
osophy advanced in Political Justice regards certain individual rights as funda-
mental and almost inviolable. This seems quite strange, given his insistence
that justice is only a matter of utilitarian calculation.14 But since utilitarianism
as a moral theory is ultimately reducible to the foundational protection of a
right to equal treatment, this should not be particularly worrying.15 My argu-
ment is that Godwin’s political theory contains other rights in addition to this
one entitlement to equal weight in the utilitarian calculus of interests; one of
these rights is the right to own private property, and this right is explicable
through an oft-ignored distinction between the realms of politics and moral-
ity in his thought. “There cannot,” Godwin asserts, “be a more absurd prop-
osition than that which afﬁrms the right of doing wrong.”16 Yet my claim is
that, for him, the right to own private property that he defends exempliﬁes
just such a right.
Property in Political Justice
The subject of property is a major occupation of Godwin’s lengthy Enquiry
Concerning Political Justice—one that he described as “the key-stone that com-
pletes the fabric of political justice”17—and forms the focus for the whole of its
eighth and ﬁnal book. This book, “Of Property,” has, in terms of its reception
history, something of a life of its own, having been published throughout the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a stand-alone piece by British lib-
erals and early socialists. It is one of the sections of Political Justice that
rights theories among 1790s radicals, see for Paine, Mark Philp, Paine (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989) and Gregory Claeys, Thomas Paine: Social and Political Thought
(London: Unwin Hymen, 1989); for Wollstonecraft, Lena Halldenius, “The Primacy of
Right: On the Triad of Liberty, Equality, and Virtue in Wollstonecraft’s Political
Thought,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15 (2007): 75–99; and for
Thelwall, Iain Hampsher-Monk, “John Thelwall and the Eighteenth-Century Radical
Response to Political Economy,” The Historical Journal 34 (1991): 1–20.
13Godwin, Political Justice, 192.
14See, for example, ibid., 191–99.
15As John Stuart Mill notes, the individual right of equal treatment is not a deviation
from the utility principle but “the very principle itself”; what gets the theory off the
ground in the ﬁrst place. Mill, “Utilitarianism,” in The Collected Works of John Stuart
Mill, vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1969), 258.
16Godwin, Political Justice, 196.
17Ibid., 701.
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Godwin most substantially revised between the ﬁrst edition of the text pub-
lished in 1793 and the third and ﬁnal version in 1798. It has even been
suggested that because it was the ﬁnal section of the book to be completed,
with the preceding parts already sent to the printers, it demonstrates signiﬁ-
cant theoretical variances with those earlier parts, such that Godwin felt
urged in the latter two editions to attempt to make the whole cohere in a
way that the ﬁrst did not.18
Whether this is the case or not, no doubt his views did evolve, and the
initial hostility that Godwin expressed toward property as an established
institution softened somewhat between the ﬁrst and third editions as did
his primitivist rejection of commerce.19 The motives behind Godwin’s revi-
sions have been much discussed by scholars, and various explanations for
them have been put forward, including the possibility that he “bent before
the blast” in response to the increasingly violent turn taken by the French
Revolution, an event that he had initially lauded.20 Even if his increasing
concern about events in France (and what he saw as the contemporaneously
dangerous radical turn taken by British Jacobin organizations like the London
Corresponding Society) did not solely or directly alter his beliefs, it is, never-
theless, the case that the two later editions of the text contain stronger
criticisms of revolutions and political association as well as a ﬁrmer commit-
ment to the legitimacy of property ownership as a social institution.21
Perhaps because of predominant concerns with the motivations lying
behind his revisions and with the way in which his account of property ﬁts
with the rest of his theory, Godwin’s argument is often treated as nothing
but an ideological mouthpiece, a “manifesto for the liberal individualistic
world view that lashed out at the still powerful remnants of the corporate
and hierarchical polity.”22 By contrast, my analysis of Godwin’s theory of
property is one uninterested in the ideological motivations that might
explain the various changes he made between editions, but interested
instead with offering a plausible interpretation of what his theory of
18Gregory Claeys, “The Effect of Property on Godwin’s Theory of Justice,” Journal of
the History of Philosophy 22 (1984): 81–101.
19For a discussion of this, see Claeys, The French Revolution Debate in Britain, 127–34.
20This claim was advanced by George Woodcock in his introduction to William
Godwin: Selections from Political Justice (London: Freedom Press, 1943), 4. For a critical
discussion of the claim, which also provides a comprehensive account of Godwin’s
revisions on property and revolutions and the possible contextual reasons behind
the shifts in his thought, see Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 120–41.
21Godwin had a temporary fall-out with John Thelwall in 1795 that centered on
Godwin’s authorship of “Considerations on Lord Grenville and Mr. Pitt’s Bills,” a
pamphlet that criticized the political tumult inevitably caused by the activities of
political associations. These worries were also given expression in Political Justice,
266–92. See Kramnick, “Introduction” to Political Justice, 32–50.
22Kramnick, Republicanism and Bourgeois Radicalism, 63.
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property—as fully developed in the third edition—approximates as a theory.
By the third and ﬁnal edition of Political Justice, which was never explicitly
revised, his account of property had changed into something remarkably
complex, a mixture of potent social criticism and normative political philos-
ophy. This complex mixture can be presented as incoherent but it need not
be.23 As far as the social criticism is concerned, Godwin appears at his most
protosocialist: “[A]ccumulated property,” he declares, “treads the powers of
thought in the dust, extinguishes the spark of genius, and reduces the great
mass of mankind to be immersed in sordid cares.”24 Yet despite the retention
of such severe criticism of the institution of property ownership that marked
the ﬁrst edition, the other aspect, the normative claims, had the effect of alter-
ing the political character of the theory signiﬁcantly and, ultimately, the argu-
ment he offers seems to comprise a defense of the right to own private
property.
One of Godwin’s initial contentions is that the institution of property own-
ership has a negative, almost ideological effect on the minds of individuals,
one that essentially alters human nature. “There is nothing” he suggests,
“that more powerfully tends to distort our judgment and opinions than erro-
neous notions concerning the goods of fortune.”25 The mere “accumulation”
of property creates a “servile and truckling spirit . . . to every house in the
nation.”26 An unequal distribution of property creates a “continual spectacle
of injustice,” which is then perpetuated as the “universal passion” becomes
“to acquire wealth and to display it” and “the whole structure of human
society is made a system of the narrowest selﬁshness.”27 He concludes that
“however great and extensive” the evils presented by “monarchies,”
“courts,” “priests,” and “criminal laws,” “these are imbecile and impotent
compared with the evils that arise out of the established administration of
property.”28 Yet, as will become clear, despite his severe criticisms of the
effect upon society of property ownership, Godwin does not suggest that
individuals should not have the right to own property.
23It might be argued—by someone inﬂuenced by the methodological writings of
Quentin Skinner—that the entire project of trying to present Godwin’s theory of prop-
erty as coherent is a misguided one and is evidence of bewitchment by a “myth of
coherence.” See Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” in
Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, vol. 1, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 67–70. While there is, of course, a danger of mistakenly
seeing and presenting coherence where there is in fact none, Skinner’s “myth” is
best read as heuristic advice rather than as any methodological rule, for there is no
reason to assume that authors do not strive for coherence in their writings.
24Godwin, Political Justice, 730.
25Ibid., 701.
26Ibid., 725.
27Ibid., 727.
28Ibid., 725.
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But before we turn to questions of ownership and distribution, it is necess-
ary to ask, what exactly counts as property for Godwin? “We do not,” he
claims, “call the person who accidentally takes his dinner at my table the pro-
prietor of what he eats” even though “it is he, in the direct and obvious sense,
who receives the beneﬁt of it.”29 Property is not, then, simply an object from
which an agent happens to beneﬁt. The term instead “implies some perma-
nence of external possession, and includes in it the idea of a possible compe-
titor.”30 So property is, by deﬁnition, something an individual has
legitimately a claim right over, a right that necessarily excludes other
agents who have a corresponding duty to forbear from interference with it.
The scope of property that Godwin details turns out to be quite wide: it
seems to refer to anything that must be appropriated in order for individuals
to live a happy life: “[S]uch things in particular are food, clothing, habitation
and furniture.”31 Godwin then further divides property (the “good things of
the world”) into four different classes:
1. “subsistence,”
2. “the means of intellectual and moral improvement,”
3. inexpensive gratiﬁcations, and
4. luxuries—described as “such gratiﬁcations as are by no means essential
to healthful and vigorous existence, and cannot be purchased but with
considerable labour and industry.”32
Godwin singles out luxury goods, which, he claims, more than any other
class, “interposes an obstacle in the way of equal distribution.”33 In spite of
this, he insists that luxuries are completely inferior to the other three classes
of property. This is because individuals are capable of happiness without
the possession of such goods, which can anyway only be obtained by “abridg-
ing multitudes of men to a deplorable degree.”34 There would seem to be
no necessary reason for a utilitarian theorist to advance this argument. The
acquisition of luxury goods is, as Godwin acknowledges, a pleasurable
activity, and in so being, something that would seem to make a signiﬁcant
contribution to the overall stock of general happiness. But Godwin maintains
that “no man, if the direct pleasure were the only thing in consideration, would
think the difference to himself worth purchasing by the oppression of
multitudes.”35
29Ibid., 709 (emphasis added).
30Ibid.
31Ibid., 702.
32Ibid., 703–4.
33Ibid., 704.
34Ibid.
35Ibid., 705 (emphasis added).
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There are two arguments at work in Godwin’s critique of luxuries. First,
there is the claim that even were an agent to derive a huge quantity of plea-
sure from the acquisition of a luxury good, that agent’s pleasure happens to be
far outweighed by the suffering of those who had toiled to manufacture the
good in question. His second argument does not rely on this essentially
empirical assumption. Unlike the ﬁrst argument, which is predicated on cal-
culation, his second claim is that while individuals should not refuse pleasure
when it is available, the acquisition and ownership of luxury goods is a
special case, for it is a source of the sort of pleasure that is in some important
sense artiﬁcial. The popularity of such pleasure, indeed the very existence of
such pleasure, can, in Godwin’s view, be attributed to malignant social forces.
The acquisition and consumption of luxury goods should thus be regarded as
what he elsewhere describes as an inferior primary, rather than superior sec-
ondary, pleasure.36 To illustrate this point, Godwin lauds Epicurus’s commit-
ment to a plain diet of fresh herbs and spring water at the expense of more
“boisterous” refreshments. The habits of Epicurus should serve as an analo-
gous example for other individual desires, for things such as “the splendour
of furniture, equipage and dress.”37 Godwin’s contention is that were individ-
uals to be interested solely in “direct pleasure,” they would not wish to make
others suffer and as a result, would lose interest in luxury goods.38
The Three “Degrees” of Property Ownership
Utility and Need
Having introduced the different classes of good over which an individual can
hold a property right, Godwin then goes on to identify three degrees of own-
ership, three different potential justiﬁcations for private property rights, one
of which he endorses and two of which he rejects.39 The ﬁrst, which he
endorses, is the “simplest” degree, according to which
36The qualitative distinction Godwin draws between types of pleasure is expressed
in terms of “primary” (“pleasures of the external senses”) and “secondary” (like “intel-
lectual feeling, the pleasures of sympathy, and the pleasures of self-approbation”) and
the latter are “more exquisite” than the former (ibid., 75).
37Ibid., 705.
38He does not seem to deploy the term “direct pleasure” in any systematic or deﬁni-
tive manner, but it seems akin to the qualitatively more valuable “secondary plea-
sures” that he describes in the “summary of principles” that he inserted at the start
of the third edition (ibid., 74–78).
39Godwin’s decision to refer to justiﬁcations of property rights as “degrees” of own-
ership is strange and has confused some commentators. Laura Brace, for instance,
appears to argue that all three degrees are part of the same system of property (The
Politics of Property: Labour, Freedom and Belonging [Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 2004], 51). Clark’s interpretation of the text, whereby Godwin “describes three
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my permanent right in those things the use of which being attributed to
me, a greater sum of beneﬁt or pleasure will result than could have other-
wise appropriated. It is of no consequence, in this case, how I came into
possession of them, the only necessary conditions being their superior
usefulness to me, and that my title to them is such as is generally
acquiesced in by the community in which I live. Every man is unjust
who conducts himself in such a manner respecting these things as to
infringe, in any degree, upon my power of using them, at the time
when the using them will be of real importance to me.40
So, according to this ﬁrst degree of property, the condition for individual
ownership is simply the utility that such a circumstance generates: I have
an exclusive right to a particular resource because I can make use of it to
increase my happiness and, in turn, the overall stock of general happiness.
Moreover, “it is of no consequence how I came” to appropriate the particular
piece of property, only that I am in possession of it. This justiﬁcation seems
unique within modern theories of property. Indeed, thinkers that offer a
moral defense of exclusive property rights typically do so by placing the jus-
tiﬁcatory burden on some form of individual action, such as ﬁrst occupancy,
labor, or the like. Thus, in the natural law tradition, Grotius justiﬁes private
property rights based on ﬁrst occupancy using Cicero’s analogy of theater
seats41 and Locke on the basis of individual acts of labor-mixing.42 Even
Hegel’s account of property ownership in The Philosophy of Right, while see-
mingly unwilling to grant intrinsic moral signiﬁcance to either ﬁrst occupancy
or labor, is clearly committed to the belief that the legitimacy of a particular prop-
erty holding is dependent on some form of individual action (e.g., taking posses-
sion, farming, etc.). For him, “my inner idea and will that something should be
mine is not enough to constitute property”;43 rather there must be some physical
externalization of that will for property to exist. For Godwin’s ﬁrst degree of
property ownership, such activities carry no such moral weight. Whereas for
Locke, the legitimate ownership of a deer depends on “who hath killed it”
and rights over a hare depend on “who pursues her during the Chase,” for
Godwin such activities cannot confer rights.44
possible systems of property and ranks them according to their conformity with
justice,” is much more convincing (Clark, Philosophical Anarchism, 249–50).
40Godwin, Political Justice, 710.
41Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, trans. F. W. Kelsey, vol. 2 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1925), I.II.I.5.
42John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), II: §27.
43G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), §51.
44Locke, Two Treatises, II: §30.
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Of course, the type of justiﬁcation Godwin invokes here entails that owner-
ship rights are, while exclusive, nevertheless remarkably insecure. This is
clearly implied in an earlier discussion of the nature of justice, in which he
makes clear that “every shilling” we possess is “appropriated by the laws
of morality,” and because of this, I have “no right to dispose of [my property]
at my caprice.”45 Thus, while utility grounds our right to ownership, it also
places inevitably severe limitations on it. Indeed, as Alan Ryan points out,
this argument would seem to amount “to the denial of anything one could
call property rights at all.” “Anyone,” Ryan suggests, “who thinks
Godwinian utilitarianism a plausible version of utilitarianism has to accept
that utilitarianism is not in principle favourable to property rights.”46 The
reason for this is that any agent’s right of ownership would seem potentially
transferable to any other agent at any given moment, provided that the agent
in question could make better use of it and, in doing so, generate more utility.
The utilitarian defense of property rights is, therefore, really an argument for
“stewardship” rather than “ownership” as it robs the institution of the perma-
nency that seems to deﬁne it.47
However, it is clear that this utilitarian idea of property rights is not as
straightforwardly thoroughgoing as it ﬁrst seems. Godwin’s moral theory is
often depicted as comprising the strictest possible utilitarian argument. In
one sense, this is true; his theory is utilitarian and the stipulations are strict.
But it is not, despite what he himself sometimes appears to suggest, an
act-utilitarian theory.48 Indeed, he details a number of crucial moral rules
45Godwin, Political Justice, 199.
46Alan Ryan, Property and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 93.
47This should not be confused with the Christian “stewardship” argument often
thought to underpin the spoilage proviso present in Locke’s account of ownership
rights in the Second Treatise. For Locke, individual ownership rights evaporate
when there is a risk that the goods in question shall go to waste (Two Treatises, II:
§§31, 38). The goods in question essentially return to the “common” and can be
re-appropriated accordingly by other individuals. The utilitarian idea of stewardship
that Godwin defends goes much further. It would seem that for him, an individual
might make good use of property—very good use even—but still not be able to
reserve an inviolable right over it. All that it takes for an ownership right to be trans-
ferred to another is if that other can make better use than the possessor. And after the
right is transferred, the next “steward” has no more secure an entitlement to it than
the previous one.
48Godwin’s moral philosophy is distinct from act-utilitarianism in numerous ways,
including: his insistence that a virtuous intention is a necessary ingredient to a moral
action rather than just the outcome of that action (Political Justice, 185); his construal of
human happiness in nonhedonistic terms (75–78, 391–95); the discretionary weight he
affords affective relationships under “ordinary” circumstances (173); the inviolable
right to individual freedom he defends (200–208); and, as will be shown below, his
defense of rights to private property ownership even under circumstances where
their effect on society is to reduce overall utility.
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and individual rights that undermine any act-utilitarian reading of his thought.
Nor is his account of property ownership simply act-utilitarian. In the passage
quoted above, in which Godwin outlines the utilitarian basis for the right of
ownership, there is a carefully worded clause that signiﬁcantly modiﬁes
what might seem at ﬁrst to be the nature of the argument. He describes as
“unjust” any individual who infringes upon my property right if the use of
the property in question is “of real importance to me.” This condition is quite
different from that found in a standard utilitarian line of argument. For the
strictest act-utilitarian, all that is necessary for an individual to relinquish a
property right over an object would be a failure to make optimal use of a par-
ticular object or resource—or, more precisely, a failure to make more use of it
than anybody else could. But what Godwin seems to suggest instead is that
an individual agent has the right to a piece of property, provided that individ-
ual can make personal use of it without taking into account wider consider-
ations of general utility. The utility to be protected is not that of society at all,
but only of the individual person who is in possession of the property in ques-
tion at a certain time. Therefore, to put this in terms of how one would come to
own property within Godwin’s utilitarianism, the appropriation of the object
can take place in any fashion, provided that the object that is appropriated
has some discernible personal use-value for the appropriator and the object
is not currently in the possession of another agent for whom it has such a per-
sonal use-value. So, when Godwin states that my ownership of property is
justiﬁable because of its “superior usefulness to me,” the emphasis should
not be regarded as on the usefulness as such, but on the fact that it is useful
to me speciﬁcally. The deﬁnition of use is a personal, subjective one.
The ﬁrst degree of ownership that Godwin identiﬁes can, therefore, be con-
strued as one that involves a consideration of individual need; because all an
individual has to do in order to secure a right is claim that it serves some sub-
jective use. The nature of the right generated by need is such that it overrides
or excludes wider concerns about the maximization of overall utility. No indi-
vidual, therefore, has the right to “make use of my apartment, furniture or
garments, or of my food, in the way of barter or loan, without having ﬁrst
obtained my consent.”49 The implication seems to be that all that is required
to secure a property right is that an individual has a (subjectively deﬁned)
need for it and, therefore, must provide their consent to any other who
seeks to use it. But how would this work in practical, political terms? How
would disputes between two agents over a property holding be resolved
were both to claim that the holding in question was of personal, subjective
use to them? Such a dispute would seem at ﬁrst insoluble because individual
need is deﬁned in subjective terms. As will become clear, though, this
problem evaporates because of the principle of consent that emerges to stabil-
ize political rights of ownership when faced with the issue of moral equality.
49Ibid., 710.
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Merit and Reward
The second degree of ownership that Godwin considers and rejects is that
which suggests “every man is entitled over the produce of his own industry,
even that part of it the use of which ought not to be appropriated to
himself.”50 This seems to be an argument for property ownership as a reward
for effort exerted—though this is a strange way of putting it and the “part”
of property that “ought not” to be appropriated through industry remains
undeﬁned. Earlier in Political Justice, Godwin does in some sense validate the
principle of reward through his assertion that it is part of what it means to
treat individuals as equal moral agents.51 However, although he describes the
claim that property should be distributed according to merit as a proposition
that is in some sense true, after some analysis of reward as a basis for such a
distribution he rejects it. It is worth exploring exactly why he does so.
He introduces a number of reasons to reject reward as a suitable criterion
for property ownership. First, he suggests—in tune with his writings on the
corrupting role played by government on individuals52—that positive insti-
tutions are unable to provide a forum for the facilitation of virtue. The exist-
ence of rewards necessarily threatens utility because it inevitably prevents the
acquisition of a virtuous intention, which, for Godwin, is a necessary com-
ponent of moral action.53 Thus, when considering the distribution of property
according to some kind of desert principle, he maintains that “human excel-
lence will be more effectually forwarded by those encouragements which
inevitably arise from the system of the universe” rather than those that are
purposefully institutionalized.54 He adds,
if you show yourself deserving, you shall have the essence of a hundred
times more food than you can eat, and a hundred times more clothes
than you can wear. You shall have the patent for taking away from
others the means of a happy and respectable existence, and for consuming
them in riotous and unmeaning extravagance. Is this the reward that
ought to be offered to virtue, or that virtue should stoop to take?55
50Ibid.
51His claim is that the argument that “the treatment to which men are entitled is to
be measured by their merits and their virtues” is “in reality, so far from being adverse
to equality in any tenable sense, [it] is friendly to it, and is accordingly known by the
appellation of equity, a term derived from the same origin” (ibid., 183–84).
52Ibid., 243–47.
53He describes as virtuous “any action or actions of an intelligent being proceeding
from kind and benevolent intention and having a tendency to contribute to general
happiness” and insists that “in whatever instance either the tendency or the intention
is wanting, the virtue is incomplete” (ibid., 184).
54Ibid., 707.
55Ibid.
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The argument here, then, is that the recognition of merit or virtue and corre-
sponding reward is simply not justiﬁable in the case of property, because the
only real reward is the spectacle of others suffering. The conclusion Godwin
reaches is unsurprisingly that this second degree of property ownership is “a
sort of usurpation,” which “vests in me the preservation and dispensing of
that which in point of complete and absolute right belongs to you.”56 It is
not, for Godwin, a legitimate justiﬁcation for property ownership and
it is deﬁnitely inferior to the ﬁrst (need-based utilitarian) degree that he
identiﬁes.
Commerce
The description of the third degree of property ownership described by
Godwin is the “system” that currently exists, which “occupies the most vig-
ilant attention in the civilized states of Europe” and involves occasions when
“one man enters into the faculty of disposing of the produce of another man’s
industry.”57 This system sounds very much like capitalism.58 He claims that
its perpetuation is largely reliant on the practice of inheritance, which he
appears to regard as an illegitimate practice: what is “bequeathed” by a prop-
erty owner after death is merely a “mouldy patent which they show as a title
to extort from their neighbours what the labour of those neighbours has pro-
duced.”59 It is within his critical discussion of this system that he is often at his
most protosocialist, claiming that “there is scarcely any species of wealth,
expenditure or splendour, existing in any civilized country, that is not, in
some way, produced by the express manual labour, and corporeal industry
of the inhabitants of that country.”60 Although property is the product of
manual labor, this system does not guarantee any subsequent entitlement
to the object labored upon. In fact,
Every man may calculate, in every glass of wine he drinks, and every
ornament he annexes to his person, howmany individuals have been con-
demned to slavery and sweat, incessant drudgery, unwholesome food,
continual hardships, deplorable ignorance, and brutal insensibility, that
he may be supplied with these luxuries.61
56Ibid., 711.
57Ibid., 711.
58Though he does not actually employ the term “capitalism,” to ascribe such a
concept to him for the purpose of analytical exegesis does not seem outlandishly
anachronistic—he does, for instance, refer to “capitalist” individuals. He refers to
the “capitalist” as “an idle and useless monopolizer” (ibid., 793).
59Ibid., 712.
60Ibid., 711.
61Ibid., 711–12.
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The production of luxury goods condemns numerous individuals to “drud-
gery,” “continual hardship,” and other discomforts, despite the irony that
those condemned are in fact responsible for the labor necessary for the pro-
duction in the ﬁrst place. Within this system,
Very little indeed is employed to increase the happiness or conveniences
of the poor. . . . Those who, by fraud or force, have usurped the power
of buying and selling the labour of the great mass of the community are
sufﬁciently disposed to take care that they should never do more than
subsist.62
It is, then, part of the nature of this system that those who labor are main-
tained barely at subsistence level.
Godwin recognizes that the justiﬁcation for this system of property owner-
ship—based on the production of luxuries and the practice of inheritance—
stands “in direct contradiction” to the reward-based, “second degree” principle
of property. This is presumably because he notes the tension between the
principle of reward, which distributes property according to the behavior
of an agent and the principle of inheritance, which is based on the choice
of an individual to bequeath, a choice that need have nothing to do with
concerns with merit or desert.
Although Godwin’s criticisms of a commercial or capitalist system are
severe, it should be noted that their basis does not seem necessarily to be a
protosocialist conception of exploitation reliant on the claim that workers
have an entitlement to the value of their labor. As noted earlier, when discuss-
ing the ﬁrst degree of ownership, Godwin claims that any evaluation of the
justness of a holding is independent of how an individual comes to possess
it, which suggests a severance of any link between legitimate ownership
and any intrinsically important moral action, including individual acts of
labor. In addition to this apparent rejection of any link between particular
actions and rights of private ownership, for Godwin labor as a human activity
is actually something to be bemoaned, an evil that cannot be meaningfully
distinguished from drudgery. He even suggests that “the most desirable
state of human society would require that the quantity of manual labor and
corporal industry to be exerted . . . be reducedwithin as narrow limits as poss-
ible.”63 He further takes this conviction to entail that the circumstance under
which individuals employ others is morally questionable. Thus, “the country-
gentleman who . . . ﬁnds work for hundreds of industrious poor is the enemy,
and not, as has been commonly imagined, the friend, of his species.”64 What
also follows from this is that any technological innovations that increase
employment are likewise to be distrusted.65
62Ibid., 713.
63Ibid., 712.
64Ibid.
65Ibid.
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There does not seem substantial evidence of a concept of a moral entitle-
ment based on labor in Political Justice. But what Godwin deﬁnitely does
appear to ﬁnd objectionable about the treatment of workers in a capitalist
economy is that this system of production—one that prioritizes luxuries—
makes individual workers suffer. As the previously cited passage makes
clear, the “slavery and sweat, incessant drudgery, unwholesome food, contin-
ual hardships, deplorable ignorance, and brutal insensibility” that is experi-
enced by workers, the painful nature of this experience is important to him
and appears to be as close as Godwin comes to offering a deﬁnition of exploi-
tation. Seemingly, if this third degree of property violates any rights, it is the
right not to feel the kind of pain caused by this type of labor, which is a right
that would beﬁt comfortably the utilitarian framework described so far.
Individuals appear to have an equal right to a certain minimum level of
welfare that Godwin believes capitalism to violate inevitably.
This is a potentially contestable interpretation of Godwin’s critique of capit-
alism. It could be argued that Godwin’s opposition to capitalism reveals no
such “right to a minimum level of welfare,” but instead just another commit-
ment to utilitarian calculation. Thus, because there are a larger number of
exploited workers than there are capitalists, an alternatively plausible
interpretation would seem to be that his critique is a contingent one rather
than one intrinsic to capitalism as an economic system. On this reading, if
there happened to be fewer exploited individuals than individual exploiters
(and thus more happiness than unhappiness generated), the utilitarian calcu-
lus would produce a different result, and Godwin would have to produce a
different argument. In other words, perhaps it is not capitalism as an econ-
omic system that wrongs individuals through instances of exploitation
(or exploitative relationships), but rather the large amount of pain that
happens to have been created by it—and therefore it is not simply the case
that capitalist property violates individual rights. Some of the comments
Godwin makes do seem to lend credence to this alternative, basic utilitarian,
interpretation. At one point, he does suggest that
whatever may be the value of the life of man, or rather whatever would be
his capability of happiness in a free and equal society, the system we are
here opposing [capitalism] may be considered as arresting, upon the
threshold of existence, four ﬁfths of that value and that happiness.66
The problem with capitalism here seems to be quite clear: it erodes the happi-
ness of workers, “four ﬁfths” of their potential happiness to be exact, and is,
therefore, wrong for instrumental reasons. Nevertheless, other passages
clearly demonstrate that there is no contingent aspect to Godwin’s critique
of capitalism: for him “it is a system in whatever manner established, by
which one man enters into the faculty of disposing of the produce of
66Ibid., 735.
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another man’s industry.”67 It is, then, an evil because of the exploitation of
workers, which is an evil because it entails unhappiness; but this unhappiness
is an inevitable part of the system, and while the system exists, nothing can
serve to diminish the force of this unhappiness.68
Equality and Property
So far, then, Godwin’s discussion of private property ownership has centered
on possible justiﬁcations for its existence and his claim is that it cannot be jus-
tiﬁed on grounds of merit or reward. Nor can it be justiﬁed as part of the exist-
ing economic system, because that system is itself unjust. Rather, the only
acceptable justiﬁcation is that of utility deﬁned subjectively by the agent in
question: in other words, a property holding is legitimate to the extent that
an individual needs it, where need is deﬁned in personal terms. But how
does (or can) this justiﬁcation cohere with the other, critical, component of
Godwin’s account of property, which details the negative consequences
caused by its existence? Indeed, in “Of Property,” he devotes far more
space to outlining the “beneﬁts attendant on a system of equality” of owner-
ship and to deﬂecting criticisms of such a “system” than to the aforemen-
tioned case for its legitimacy.69
67Ibid., 711.
68But what if, despite the inevitable nature of exploitative relations within capital-
ism, this system of property did somehow manage to produce an overbalance of plea-
sure rather than pain? What, indeed, if the number of exploiters increased (and the
number of exploited correspondingly decreased) to the point when the quantity of
happiness experienced by the former signiﬁcantly outweighs (and thus negates) the
quantity of pain experienced by the latter? Godwin does not actually seem to consider
this possibility, but there appear to be two answers available to him. The ﬁrst would
simply be to suggest that it is in the nature of the system to have alwaysmore exploited
than exploiters, and the scenario just suggested would, therefore, be an impossible
one. Such a response does not seem particularly impressive, especially since there is
a far better alternative open to him, which is already implicit in his account of utilitar-
ianism. For Godwin, pleasure is most deﬁnitely nonhedonistic (see ibid., 75–78), so
any calculation of happiness is not a straightforwardly quantitative calculation. He
also makes clear that the deﬁnitive characteristic of the capitalist is the pursuit of
luxury goods, and that this pursuit belongs among the lower rank of pleasures. In
qualitative terms, then, any comparison between the pleasures of the exploiter and
the severe pain felt by the exploited will inevitably favor the latter. It is both the
nature of capitalism and the nature of pleasure, then, that generates the individual
right not to experience a certain level of pain, which can also be characterized as the
right to a certain level of welfare.
69Compare ibid., 709–24, for consideration of possible reasons for the legitimacy of
property with 725–56, for the case for a system of equality of holdings and the deﬂec-
tions of the case against.
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In his discussion of the beneﬁts of an egalitarian system of property own-
ership Godwin claims that one of the main protectors of inequality is a domi-
nant “feudal spirit.”70 This feudal spirit has effectively “reduced the great
mass of mankind to the rank of slaves and cattle for the service of a few.”71
Such inequalities then have a deleterious effect on the quality of human
life: they create “selﬁshness” among the populace, a dangerous “sense of
dependence” among the impoverished,72 and they foment criminality and
war.73 Following these criticisms of inequalities, the conclusion that
Godwin draws is that
[i]t is impossible not to see the beauty of equality, and not to be charmed
with the beneﬁts it appears to promise. It is impossible not to regret the
unbounded mischiefs and distress that grow out of the opposite system.74
This clearly amounts to a utilitarian case against the proliferation of signiﬁ-
cant inequalities in the distribution of property, since they bring only “dis-
tress” compared to the “beneﬁts” of an egalitarian alternative.
But Godwin’s argument for equality is not expressed solely in negative
terms; that is to say, he does more than simply identify the social problems
that result from the existence of inequality. Indeed, he also at several points
strongly suggests that the morally correct distribution of property is an ega-
litarian one. He explicitly claims there is “justice” in “an equal distribution of
the good things of life.”75 At the start of “Of Property,” he ﬂeshes this out
further:
It follows, upon the principles of equal and impartial justice, that the good
things of the world are a common stock, upon which one man has as valid
a title as another to draw for what he wants . . . each man has a sphere the
limit and termination of which is marked out by the equal sphere of his
neighbour. I have a right to the means of subsistence: he has an equal
right. I have a right to every pleasure I can participate without injury to
myself or others; his title in this respect is of similar extent.76
Godwin here defends a number of fundamental equal rights, on which it
seems there can be no negotiation or compromise.77 Most remarkable is his
70At one point he declares (in response to Burke) that the “age of chivalry is not
gone” (ibid., 726).
71Ibid.
72Ibid., 727, 725.
73Ibid., 731–32.
74Ibid., 741.
75Ibid., 725.
76Ibid., 703.
77As Clark observes, Godwin’s “egalitarian view of human nature leads him to this
position. Since each person shares in a universal nature, there should be a presumption
of the equal right of all to property, until evidence is presented to justify the superior
right of one over another” (Philosophical Anarchism, 249).
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assertion that the “good things of the world” are “common” and because of
this, every individual has an equal right to “draw for what he wants.” The
implication is that the good things of the world are commonly owned and
that not only are inequalities in private property unjust, but private property
is itself unjust as it establishes exclusive rights over things. What Godwin’s
argument thus seems to entail is that every individual has an “equal right”
to the “means of subsistence” provided the use of such provisions does not
cause “injury” to another agent.
This is a sentiment repeated later in “Of Property” where he suggests that
“for any man to enjoy the most trivial accommodation, while, at the same
time, a similar accommodation is not accessible to every other member of
the community is, absolutely speaking, wrong.”78 This certainly looks like a
very radical egalitarianism, with far-reaching consequences for any idea of
property rights. It would seem to entail that either
(a) Any initial act of appropriation that fails to leave a “similar” object for
another (or the opportunity of acquiring a similar object) is unjust, or
(b) All exclusive ownership rights (that is rights that are absolute and
require a duty of forbearance in others) are unjust.
Clearly, neither of these options is compatible with any of the three degrees of
property that Godwin has previously considered. This incompatibility is
unimportant as far as the second and third systems (meritocracy and capital-
ism) are concerned, because he rejects them outright anyway. But there is
surely a conﬂict between his particular defense of equality (and what it
entails) and the ﬁrst utilitarian system of property that he favors. As
shown, the utilitarian justiﬁcation favored by Godwin ignored how property
was initially acquired and established that the basis for ownership was indi-
vidual need. This clearly does not ﬁt with what is an egalitarian case for
common ownership and against private acquisition because the deﬁnition
of need is to be deﬁned by the individual owner. If an individual can claim
a legitimate property right over an object simply on the basis that it is
needed, then this object can clearly not be owned equally or commonly. To
render Godwin’s account coherent, it is necessary to further explore his analy-
sis of property and moral equality.
As shown above, Godwin’s critical analysis of the three different distribu-
tive systems indicates that it is not private property ownership per se that is
of particular concern for him, but rather its unequal distribution. The third
(capitalist) system is most glaringly inegalitarian, because of the inevitable
suffering it causes. The second (meritocratic) system is seemingly preferable
to the third, but as noted is also rejected for egalitarian reasons: distributing
property according to reward “vests in me the preservation and dispensing
78Godwin, Political Justice, 712.
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of that which in point of complete and absolute right belongs to you.”79 But
what is this “complete and absolute” right? Is it, as Godwin’s analysis of
capitalism might be taken to imply, some right not to experience a certain
level of pain, which could also be conceptualized as a right to a certain stan-
dard of welfare? One plausible answer seems implicit in the reasons he gives
for preferring the ﬁrst, utilitarian justiﬁcation to the alternatives. As the
earlier discussion indicates, Godwin appears at ﬁrst to endorse a utilitarian
theory of property, but, on further inspection, only applies utilitarian criteria
to the individual owner rather than to society as a whole: it is personal hap-
piness (also describable as subjective need) that carries moral weight rather
than the overall happiness of a society. Thus, an agent can be said to hold a
legitimate ownership right to an object for as long as it is “of importance” to
that individual, regardless of the overall social utility that would be gener-
ated by the transference of that ownership right to another.
In practical terms, what is also important about this justiﬁcation is that,
once established through possession, exclusive rights over property
become fairly secure and can be maintained indeﬁnitely. This can in turn
entail severely inegalitarian circumstances. Indeed, the sort of exploitative
scenario that Godwin rails against so passionately in his critique of capital-
ism seems potentially validated by his argument. Consider the following
scenario. The world is carved up, with some individuals acquiring land
through nonviolent means, such as cultivation and enclosure, and some
individuals through violent means. The individual cultivator who has
possession of a particular piece of property is then able to recruit
workers—who are willing to work because they have no such property
themselves—in order to produce luxury goods. To any imputed exploita-
tion, the property owner can simply respond with the claim identiﬁed
above that such land is of “real importance to me.”80 Such a claim,
though subject to limited veriﬁcation, is, according to Godwin’s utilitarian
scheme, quite sufﬁcient to undermine any egalitarian argument against the
right of ownership. Thus, any potential dispute over the ownership of a par-
ticular resource is not to be settled by reference to any egalitarian standard
but rather to the issue of whether the agent in possession of it views it as of
personal use. It is enough that the land is possessed by the particular agent
and of utility to that agent for the exclusive right of ownership to be justi-
ﬁed. The possession requirement might be thought in danger of lapsing
back into ﬁrst-occupancy, but this is not the case as occupancy is a necessary
but not sufﬁcient condition for just ownership because of the subjective
utility requirement and it is this latter aspect that plays the crucial role in
the argument.
79Ibid., 711.
80Ibid., 710.
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Godwin’s Two-Level Moral Theory
There is clearly a marked conﬂict between Godwin’s substantive commitment
to an egalitarian distribution of property and the utilitarian justiﬁcation of
ownership he favors most of the three degrees. On the one hand, equality
should hold as a distributive principle for property and yet, on the other,
existing property arrangements can be construed as just with only the most
minimal of assessment criteria, and any transfer of a property holding
requires the consent of the owner. There is “justice” in “an equal distribution
of the good things of life”81 and yet the property-less cannot “make use” of
the proprietor’s “apartment, furniture or garments, or of my food, in the
way of barter or loan, without having ﬁrst obtained . . . consent.”82 There
would seem to be little hope of reaching any theoretical reconciliation
between these two perspectives, both of which Godwin defends within the
same text. Yet it is possible to resolve this conﬂict. Indeed, one way of
doing so is to regard Godwin’s theory as comprising two levels (moral on
the one hand and political on the other) and correspondingly read his two
normative claims—that property ownership is wrong for egalitarian
reasons but property ownership cannot be interfered with without the
consent of the proprietor—as being made at different ones.
Further analysis of his political philosophy as a whole should help demon-
strate this. Those keen to defend a traditional utilitarian interpretation of
Political Justice have often conveyed the impression that all his prescriptions
concern the morality of individual acts, which Godwin does occasionally
appear to suggest. “Every one of our actions,” he alleges, “fall[s] within the
province of morals,” and, therefore, “we have no rights in relation to the
selecting of them.” Such statements unsurprisingly encourage the view that
Godwin demands individuals to adhere to utilitarian calculation of all acts
and under any circumstances, which is why historian Leslie Stephen
dubbed him an “ultra-utilitarian” and why philosopher Shelly Kagan has
described him as a moral “extremist.”83 But this interpretation is actually
somewhat misleading. Though Godwin does suggest, “I am bound to
employ my talents, my understanding, my strength and my time, for the pro-
duction of the greatest quantity of general good”84 and that “everything in
my power” is bound to the “general weal,”85 it is clear that this is in fact
not actually the case when it comes to gauging the political permissibility
of such individual acts, but only their moral legitimacy.
81Ibid., 725.
82Ibid., 710.
83Leslie Stephen, The English Utilitarians (London: Duckworth, 1900), 231; Shelly
Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 1–2, 10.
84Godwin, Political Justice, 175.
85Ibid., 174.
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This becomes clear in his defense of an inviolable right for individuals to a
“sphere of discretion,” a sphere that guarantees them the freedom to decide
whether or not to obey the various dictates of morality he identiﬁes. Within
such a sphere, “it is necessary that every man should stand by himself, and
rest upon his own understanding” when it comes to deciding on a particular
course of action: individuals must, then, be ensured this certain area of liberty,
within which they are subject only to the reasoned arguments of others but
not to any coercion or interference.86 Godwin refers to this individual entitle-
ment as “the right to private judgment.” This right is not a self-justiﬁable
“natural right,” which he refers to as an “active” right.87 It is rather what
he terms a “passive” right justiﬁed on the grounds of its intrinsic connection
with human development: It “derives its force . . . from the consideration that
a greater sum of happiness will result from its observance than from its infrin-
gement.”88 Its existence enables what he refers to as “natural independence,”
which means “freedom from all constraint, except that of reasons and induce-
ments presented to the understanding.”89
The effect of this right to private judgment is ultimately to render politically
permissible actions that are morally illegitimate. So, for example, though he
suggests individuals have a moral duty always to act in a sincere manner,90
the “sphere of discretion” gives them the ability to act insincerely. Godwin’s
defense of the freedom of individuals to act insincerely, while at the same
time arguing that individuals should act sincerely might appear no less phi-
losophically contradictory than his view of property ownership. In the same
way as it appears strange for Godwin both to defend and criticize the legiti-
macy of private property ownership, it might be thought to look strange for
him to defend a principle of sincerity while simultaneously defending the
rights of individuals to decide whether always to act sincerely or not. But
both these seemingly contradictory positions can be plausibly accounted
for. As noted at the beginning of this essay, during his critical discussion of
the nature of individual rights, Godwin declares, “there cannot be a more
86Ibid., 198. No individual should “expect to dictate to me” and each “should
remember that I am to act by my deliberation and not his. He may exercise a repub-
lican boldness in judging, but must not be peremptory and imperious in prescribing.”
For further discussion of the nature and justiﬁcation for individuals having such a
“sphere of discretion,” see Robert Lamb, “William Godwin on the Morality of
Freedom,” History of Political Thought 28 (2007): 661–67.
87Active rights are identiﬁed as individual entitlements simply to “do as we list”
(Political Justice, 191) and, as such, are “superseded and rendered null by the superior
claims of justice” (197).
88Ibid., 225. “The pleasure of intellectual feeling”—which is among the most “exqui-
site” (ibid., 75) pleasures—is, he claims, “connected with the soundness of our under-
standing,” which, in turn, is connected with “freedom of enquiry” (ibid., 78).
89Ibid., 754 (emphasis added).
90Ibid., 311–31.
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absurd proposition than that which afﬁrms the right of doing wrong.”91 Yet,
as Jeremy Waldron has argued (with direct reference to Godwin’s declara-
tion), the concept of a “right to do wrong” is not only a coherent one, it is
also one that actually underpins contemporary liberal accounts of political
morality.92 Waldron lists numerous activities that are morally permissible in
liberal societies but remain wrong within liberal accounts of morality, such
as campaigning for a candidate for political ofﬁce that is known to hold
racist beliefs and failing to give the time of day to a stranger. Within liberal
accounts of political morality, individuals have a right to engage in such
activities, yet these same accounts also regard the action itself as constitutive
of a wrong because it violates the commitment to equal treatment that justiﬁes
the right in the ﬁrst place.
Analysis of Godwin’s political thought, and in particular, his account of
property ownership, reveals that he recognizes an individual’s “right to do
wrong” despite his explicit rejection of such a category. Individual property
owners are wrong to retain their holdings while others are engaged in the
drudgery of luxury production, and yet they have a perfect right to do so.
Individuals should realize the beauty and the beneﬁts of an egalitarian distri-
bution of property ownership, but no authority can compel them to do so and
potentially signiﬁcant inequalities are thus permissible. The way, then, to
make sense of Godwin’s theory of property right seems to be as follows.
Equality of distribution is the morally right basis for ownership and, there-
fore, no individual agent should be able to appropriate anything that is not
available to another and because of this ownership rights should not be
thought of as absolute or exclusive. However, though a system of equality
is morally right—and hence desirable since moral rightness and desirability
are the same for Godwin—the proprietor still has a right to consent that effec-
tively trumps the egalitarian claims of any other individual. In practical
terms, then, such a right of consent emerges as more fundamental than that
of equal distribution, making an individual entitlement to hold more than
an equal share of the world’s private property an example of a “right to do
wrong.”
The justiﬁcation for this clearly relates to the “right to private judgment”
that Godwin defends: it is because every individual must be guaranteed a
sphere of discretion that nobody can be compelled to transfer any part of
their property even in extremely inegalitarian circumstances. Any such
91Ibid., 196.
92Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong,” in Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981–
1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 63–87. Although Waldron’s
claim about the theoretical coherence of the “right to do wrong” is sound and
though I argue that Godwin’s theory shows his agreement, the original declaration
in Political Justice is not conceptually nonsensical and would presumably be thought
tautological by strict act-utilitarians or consequentialists like Kagan (see The Limits of
Morality).
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transfer must be voluntary because of the evils involved in compulsion. Thus,
in the clearest statement of his position on the issue, he writes:
I have a right to the assistance of my neighbour; he has a right that it
should not be extorted from him by force. It is his duty to afford me the
supply of which I stand in need; it is my duty not to violate his province
in determining, ﬁrst, whether he is to supply me, and, secondly, in what
degree.93
The needy individual has a right to assistance from an able other, who has a
moral duty to supply it; but, crucially, this is an imperfect duty, as neither the
needy individual nor any political authority are able to enforce it legitimately.
So, when considered in Hohfeldian jural terms, the right that the needy indi-
vidual has is not a claim-right, but rather a mere privilege and the able other
does not have in fact a corresponding duty.94
So far, then, it seems plain that Godwin defends the right of one proprietor
to possess a far greater share of resources than another, and this right holds
even when that other is in a situation of “need.” The “right to do wrong” is
the (political) right to possess holdings in (morally) wrongful situations of
inequality. But how inviolable is this right, and does it hold under circum-
stances in which an individual is in very desperate need, or does imperfect
moral obligation to assist others at any point become a perfect political obli-
gation? Does the distinction between moral and political levels I have ident-
iﬁed within Godwin’s political theory entail that property holders are under
no political obligations whatsoever to the very needy? In his exposition of the
utilitarian degree of property based on subjective need outlined above, he
does state that the principle of consent applies in “ordinary cases,”95 implying
that it can be overridden in extraordinary situations, which could perhaps
mean circumstances of desperate need on the part of the property-less. But
for this to be at all compelling, there is the need to show that ordinary
cases are those in which no human life is at stake and extraordinary cases
are those in which such a life is at stake.
But there seems no necessary reason to privilege this understanding of an
extraordinary case based on need from a more straightforwardly utilitarian
understanding. For example, in his discussion of ethical impartiality,
Godwin argues that individuals should be allowed the discretion to give
due weight to partial affections only in “ordinary cases” and absolute impar-
tiality in extraordinary ones.96 But here he deﬁnes extraordinary cases as
93Ibid., 735–36.
94While the logical correlative of a claim right is a duty, the correlative of a privilege
is simply the lack of such a duty. See Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923).
95Godwin, Political Justice, 710.
96Godwin suggests the individual can follow existing social conventions by provid-
ing “in ordinary cases, for my wife and children, my brothers and relations, before
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situations of extreme moral emergency in terms of the greatest general good
rather than in terms of individual need. Thus, as he memorably illustrates,
Archbishop Fe´nelon should be rescued from a burning building at the
expense of our mother or father because he is worth far more to society.97
The impending death of Fe´nelon is an extraordinary circumstance, and, there-
fore, we cannot give the sort of weight to our partial affections that we would
in ordinary circumstances. Thus, we are morally bound to sacriﬁce our
nearest and dearest to the greater good.98 The deﬁnition of an extraordinary
case is an ultimately utilitarian one, concerned with maximizing overall hap-
piness, not a need-based one concerned with sustaining human life.
Yet in spite of the apparent unlikelihood of Godwin accommodating any
inviolable right to property for the desperately needy that is capable of
trumping the proprietor’s right to give consent to any transfer, consideration
of Political Justice as a whole does in fact reveal such a right. The suggestion
of a perfect obligation to offer assistance to the very desperately needy
appears not in book eight “Of Property,” but within an entirely separate,
critical discussion of the moral status of promises in book three on
“Principles of Government.” Herein instances of what would otherwise be
theft are rendered legitimate: as Mark Philp puts it, “in extreme cases
where I might perish if I do not violate your right of stewardship.”99
Godwin’s claim is that there are cases that “supersede” the “ordinary”
rule that “property is sacred”:100 no right of private property ownership is
completely “inviolable” because “the imperious principle of self-
preservation may authorize me to violate it.”101 “Nothing” (apart from a
prudential concern with one’s own welfare) should “prevent me from
taking by force from my neighbor’s store, if the alternative be that I must
otherwise perish with hunger.”102
Gregory Claeys argues that this right reveals Godwin to be “clearly com-
mitted to uphold the old Scholastic doctrine that theft was justiﬁed in cases
I provide for strangers,” though he admits that such an argument “is to be admitted
with great caution” (ibid., 173).
97Ibid., 169–170.
98Discussions of this aspect of Godwin’s thought include D. H. Monro, Godwin’s
Moral Philosophy: An Interpretation of William Godwin (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1951), 9–35; Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 217–33; Peter Singer, Leslie Cannold, and Helga Kuhse, “William
Godwin and the Defense of Impartialist Ethics,” Utilitas 7 (1995): 67–86; and Robert
Lamb, “The Foundations of Godwinian Impartiality,” Utilitas 18 (2006): 134–53.
99Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 135.
100Godwin, Political Justice, 225.
101Ibid., 226.
102Ibid., 225.
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of extreme necessity, such as impending starvation.”103 Though this explains
the origins of Godwin’s argument, the argument itself is distinct from it in that
the Scholastic doctrine in question involves an appeal to natural law that is
antithetical to the philosophy defended in Political Justice.104 Mark Philp’s sug-
gestion is that the right held by a desperately needy individual to claim
enough of the property of another to sustain her life is best understood as
an extension of the right to private judgment: this is because, were a proprie-
tor to allow an individual to starve to death, this action (or inaction) would
violate that person’s right to private judgment insofar as it would prevent
her from being able to make the decision herself about whether or not to
die.105 However, although this position might be thought implied by
Godwin’s theory, it is not actually entailed by it. There is no doubt that the
exercise of one person’s private judgment (to withhold assistance) will necess-
arily violate the opportunity of another to exercise hers. But it is equally the
case that if the needy individual does have a right to invade the property
of another, then this situation is simply inverted: as the exercise of one indi-
gent person’s rights to appropriate the resources that would otherwise
belong to another would violate the right of the proprietor to exercise his
private judgment about whether or not to offer assistance. The right to
private judgment seems to be violated in both scenarios. The only way in
which it can be shown that Godwin regarded one of these scenarios as prefer-
able to the other would be to demonstrate that he has some additional
commitment to the intrinsic importance of human preservation.106
But, as Philp points out, there is no such commitment in Political Justice,
wherein Godwin even suggests that “death is in itself among the slightest
of human evils.”107 Yet it is undeniable that despite this view, there is an
103Claeys, “The Effect of Property,” 97.
104This doctrine is probably most associated with Aquinas, who writes “Things per-
taining to human right cannot take anything away from natural right or Divine right.
Now according to the natural order established by Divine providence, lower things are
ordained for the purpose of supplying man’s necessities. And so the division and
appropriation of such things which proceeds from human law does not cancel out
the fact that man’s necessities must be supplied by means of those things. And so
whatever anyone has in superabundance is due under the natural law to the poor
for their succour” (Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II, Question 66, Seventh Article in
Aquinas, Political Writings, ed. R. W. Dyson [Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002], 216). Clearly Godwin’s theory has no place for natural law so understood.
105Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 137. Philp further argues that “Godwin might best
be seen as holding that the man who denies a starving person food is explicitly making
a declaration of war on the principles of society and justice, and therefore cannot
expect to be protected.”
106It is such a commitment, expressed in the “Second Treatise” (Two Treatises, II: §6)
that is usually thought to underpin Locke’s alleged defense of an unconditional sub-
sistence right in the “First Treatise” (Two Treatises, I: §42).
107Godwin, Political Justice, 272; Philp, Godwin’s Political Justice, 137.
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individual political right to subsistence provision that acts to trump the right
of private judgment when the individual in question is in danger of death.
One possible way to explain the existence of this right is ultimately utilitarian:
as individuals are capable of contributing more to the overall happiness of a
society through being alive than being dead, they have a right to the resources
necessary to keep them in that state. This interpretation would also ﬁt with
Godwin’s belief that severe inequalities in holdings can be permitted, but
not circumstances of very desperate need, because while the former do not
necessarily involve a deﬁnitive diminution of overall happiness, the latter
does. It would also ﬁt (or at least not conﬂict) with the deﬁnition of extra-
ordinary circumstances offered in the discussion of impartiality cited
above. Since one of either Fe´nelon or my parent simply cannot be saved,
the proposition that both individuals have a right to subsistence cannot
seriously be entertained, and the utilitarian argument would presumably
shift from ensuring an individual remains alive so that she can contribute
to general happiness to ensuring that the one person that can be rescued
from a burning building is the person most capable of contributing to that
happiness. It seems, then, if the level of need is desperate enough such that
the person in question will perish, the imperfect moral duty to assist actually
becomes a political right to assistance.
Conclusion
So where does this all this leave the political and philosophical identity of
Godwin’s theory of property, since as noted, he dedicates so much of his dis-
cussion to a vitriolic and egalitarian critique of capitalism; a system character-
ized by exploitation and perpetuated by inheritance? If the right of consent
holds in situations of manifest inequality as I have suggested, then
Godwin’s theory appears to present an implicit defense of this system, regard-
less of the qualitative misery it causes both the capitalists in pursuit of luxury
goods and the workers who produce them. Individuals have the right to
enough property to sustain them should their existence be in jeopardy, but
no more. He is aware of this uncomfortable entailment. The capitalist
“species of property should be respected,” he suggests, because, “ill as the
system is, it will perhaps be found that it is better than any other, which,
by any means, except those of reason, the love of distinction, or the love of
justice, can be substituted in its place.”108 Only those political strategies that
involve “reason” and such sentiments as “the love of justice,” rather than
those of violent revolution, can present legitimate avenues against the
108Godwin, Political Justice, 713 (emphasis added). Key to Godwin’s thought is the
rejection of any violent or revolutionary means of political change (266–81), which
explains his stress on reason here as a possible mechanism for reforming or replacing
the “system.”
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established system. Part of Godwin’s argument is that in order for any equal
distribution to last anyway, “positive institution” cannot force it; in order for
equality to establish itself properly, there instead must be a “change in men’s
dispositions and sentiments.”109 But the main component of the argument
reveals again his crucial commitment to the (almost) inviolable right of
private judgment:
Every man should be urged to the performance of his duty, as much as possible, by
the instigations of reason alone. Compulsion . . . if in any case to be resorted
to, is at least to be resorted to only in cases of indispensable urgency. It
is not therefore to be called in for the purpose of causing one individual
to exert a little more, or another a little less, of productive industry.
Neither is it to be called in for the purpose of causing the industrious indi-
vidual to make the precise distribution of his produce which he ought to
make. Hence it follows that, while the present erroneous opinions and
prejudices respecting accumulation continue, actual accumulation will,
in some degree, take place. . . . The most destructive of all excesses is
that where one man shall dictate to another, or undertake to compel
him to do, or refrain from doing, anything (except, as was before stated,
in cases of the most indispensable urgency) otherwise than with his
own consent. Hence it follows that the distribution of wealth in every commu-
nity must be left to depend upon the sentiments of the individuals of that
community.110
It seems at ﬁrst difﬁcult to believe that this passage comes from the same
author who so passionately argues against the painful drudgery of labor,
the exploitation of workers, and the illegitimacy of the practice of inheritance.
What is suggested here is that because every individual must be free of coer-
cion, a right of consent is generated, which then blocks any attempt to redis-
tribute any property holdings. His conclusion is that this “makes it difﬁcult to
set bounds to the extent of accumulation in one man, or of poverty and
wretchedness in another.”111 So, ultimately, although Godwin offers a
109Ibid., 714. Thus “agrarian laws, and others of a similar tendency which have been
invented for the purpose of keeping down the spirit of accumulation, deserve to be
regarded as remedies more pernicious than the disease they are intended to cure.”
The view expressed here seems evidence of Godwin’s shift away from primitivist criti-
cisms of commerce. For discussions of the republican context within which late eight-
eenth-century debates about property can be understood, see most famously J. G. A.
Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chieﬂy in
the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and for speciﬁc
discussions of the 1790s in the light of this context, see Gregory Claeys, “The Origins of
the Rights of Labor: Republicanism, Commerce, and the Construction of Modern
Social Theory in Britain, 1796–1805,” Journal of Modern History 66 (1994): 249–90
and Mark Philp, “English Republicanism in the 1790s,” Journal of Political Philosophy
6 (1998): 235–62.
110Godwin, Political Justice, 715 (emphasis added).
111Ibid., 716.
GODWIN’S THEORY OF PROPERTY 301
passionate defense of equality as a distributive principle, it is not the kind of
egalitarianism that requires (at the political level) any radical transfer of
resources, which no doubt hints that whatever other labels can be legitimately
used to classify aspects of his thought, there is clearly the case for a “liberal”
understanding of his philosophy as a whole.
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